In statistics, there are two main paradigms: classical and Bayesian statistics.
Introduction
In statistics, there are two main paradigms: classical and Bayesian statistics. A notorious problem with the Bayesian approach is the choice of prior credences. Due to Bertrand-style paradoxes, there doesn't seem to be any privileged way of choosing them.
Classical statistics is, in a sense, an attempt to factor them out. A problematic consequence of this approach is its limited applicability. Another problem is how to interpret classical notions (such as significance levels) in terms of degrees of evidential support. 1 Setting these issues aside, the purpose of this paper is rather to investigate the extent to which classicists and Bayesians can (in some suitable sense of the word) agree in situations where classical statistics is applicable. More precisely: is there always a non-trivial prior credence distribution such that, for any possible observation, a Bayesian with that credence will agree with the classicist whether the observation speaks in favor of rejecting the hypothesis or not? The answer, as we will see, is no. In section 2 and 3, I present the classical and Bayesian frameworks, respectively. In section 4, I define what I take to be a reasonable notion of agreement, and construct a case in which agreement is impossible. In section 5, I present a more general diagnosis of the conflict between classical statistics and the Bayesian theory of rational degrees of belief.
Classical statistics
In classical statistics, hypotheses about the distribution of various properties in a population are tested by observing random samples of it. On the assumption that the 1 Cf. Lindley (1957) , Berger and Sellke (1987) and Casella and Berger (1987) . sample is random, the conditional probability P (E|H) for every possible observation E and hypothesis H is usually derived as a matter of combinatorics. Given a particular hypothesis H 0 (a so called null hypothesis, which is the hypothesis to be tested), a rejection region for H 0 has to be selected, which is the set of outcomes leading to the rejection of H 0 . Formally, if Ω is a non-empty set of possible outcomes (a sample space), Σ is a σ-algebra on Ω (an event space), and Θ is a non-empty set of hypotheses, there's a function P : Σ × Θ → [0, 1] such that, for each hypothesis H ∈ Θ, the function P (·|H) : Σ → [0, 1] is a probability function. A rejection region for a hypothesis H 0 ∈ Θ is an event R ∈ Σ such that H 0 is rejected just in case an event E ∈ Σ is observed such that E ⊆ R. The question is, what should this region look like?
Saying, for instance, that one should reject a hypothesis whenever an observation is made whose probability given that hypothesis is below a certain threshold will not do, since it means rejecting the hypothesis that a coin is fair given any sufficiently long sequence of observed tosses. Likewise, it means rejecting the hypothesis that the length of the male population is somewhat normally distributed around an average of 1.85 meters, after having observed a sample with exactly that average (in general, it's highly unlikely for the average of the sample to exactly coincide with the average of the population). There are essentially two classical approaches to this problem, one by Fisher and the other by Neyman and Pearson. I will look at each of them in turn.
Fisher
Instead of rejecting a hypothesis H just in case an event E is observed such that P (E|H) is sufficiently low (which would be absurd), the general idea proposed by Fisher (1925) is to reject H just in case P (E or something more extreme|H) is sufficiently low.
Formally, for a given hypothesis H, let ≺ H be a strict partial order on Ω such that, for any E ∈ Σ, {x ∈ Ω : y ≺ H x for some y ∈ E} ∈ Σ. The intended interpretation of
x ≺ H y is that y is more extreme than x with respect to H. For any event E ∈ Σ, the so called p-value of E with respect to H and ≺ H can then be defined as follows: following example illustrates:
Example 2.1 (The shooting range). Suppose you want to test whether the aim on a rifle is straight or not (with respect to the horizontal direction). You go to a shooting range and fix the rifle aimed at a particular target. Your plan is to fire several bullets at the target, measure the horizontal distance in decimeters between the target and the point of impact for each bullet, and calculate the mean. Your null hypothesis H is that the aim is straight. Suppose that, on the assumption that the null hypothesis is true, due to random influences (in particular the shape of the bullet leaving the pipe), the sampled mean can be expected to be normally distributed around 0 with variance 1, as depicted in Figure 1 . Any statistics textbook will tell you that an outcome y is to be considered more extreme than an outcome x relative to the null hypothesis just in case the absolute distance between y and the mean 0 is greater than the absolute difference between x and 0. In other words, for any x, y ∈ R, x ≺ H y just in case |x| < |y|. One might be tempted to infer this from the shape of the probability density function f in Figure 1 alone, since f (y) < f (x) just in case |x| < |y|. To see why that would be unwise, let's look at a different but equivalent representation of the same situation, depicted in Figure 2 . Let A be the point 1 decimeter from the target in the direction of the rifle, let B be the target, and let C be a point to the left or right of the target indicating the measured mean deviation, and consider the angle v between AB and AC,
ranging in the open interval between −90 to 90 degrees. With the same random influences as before, the expected distribution on this angle is given by the probability density function g depicted in Figure 3 . But here it's no longer the case that, for any angles u, v ∈ (−90, 90), g(v) < g(u) just in case |u| < |v|.
In conclusion, the relation of being a more extreme outcome with respect to a particular hypothesis cannot be inferred from the probability distribution associated 
Neyman and Pearson
A philosophically more sophisticated theory is offered by Neyman and Pearson (1933a,b) . The basic intuition is that, whether a hypothesis should be rejected depends on whether there are better alternatives, i.e. whether there are plausible enough alternative hypotheses according to which the probability of the observation is higher.
More specifically, determining an adequate rejection region for the null hypothesis involves two notions: type 1 and type 2 errors. To commit a type 1 error is to reject a true null hypothesis. To commit a type 2 error is to not reject a false null hypothesis.
Naturally, one does not want to reject a true null hypothesis. Hence, for each proposed 7 however, even if we require that P (R|H 0 ) = α, this condition does not single out a unique rejection region. As illustrated by Barnett (1999, pp. 167-168) , if α = 0.1 and the null hypothesis yields a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1 over the sample space R, the three regions depicted in Figure 4 all meet said requirement.
The solution, according to Neyman and Pearson, is to consider the probability of making a type 2 error. Relative to some alternative hypothesis H ∈ Θ, the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis on the assumption that H is true (and hence H 0 is false) is given by P (R|H). In order to minimize the risk of making a type 2 error, we want this probability to be as high as possible. Consider Figure 5 . Suppose the alternative hypothesis H 1 yields a normal distribution with mean 1 and variance 1. Intuitively, R 2 thereby makes for a natural non-arbitrary choice of rejection region.
Indeed, it's the one Neyman and Pearson recommend. From a Bayesian point of view, they even show that such a rejection region is optimal independently of prior probabilities in the sense that, whatever the prior probabilities on hypotheses are, the probability of making a type 2 error can only increase by switching to another rejection region of the same size (Neyman and Pearson, 1933b) .
Sometimes, however, no uniformly most powerful test exists. For instance, in the presence of an alternative hypothesis H −1 yielding a normal distribution with mean −1 and variance 1, R 2 is dominated by R 1 , as can be seen in Figure 6 . Hence, against any set of alternative hypotheses including both H 1 and H −1 , no uniformly most powerful test exists for H 0 . This fact, of which Neyman and Pearson were aware, limits the applicability of their method. The lack of a uniformly most powerful tests in certain situations is a problem for classical statistics, but not one I will address in this paper.
Bayesian statistics
Compared with its classical counterparts, Bayesian statistics is straightforward.
Basically, it falls out from the more general Bayesian theory of rational degrees of belief (rational credences), comprised of the following two postulates:
1. Rational credences are coherent (in the sense of satisfying the laws of probability 
The following fact is easy to establish, and will be used in the next section:
Agreement
In order to compare classical and Bayesian statistics, let's assume that we have a situation where there is a uniformly most powerful test for the null hypothesis against the alternatives. We shall focus on the Neyman-Pearson version of classical statistics, but also say something about Fisher's version as we go along. Now, a classical statistician is not in the business of assigning rational credences to hypotheses. One may still wonder: are there any credences he might have that would (in some suitable sense of the word) agree with his statistical methods? In the discrete case, the following definition of agreement seems natural: Observe that, by (4), if Cr(H 0 ) = 1 or Cr(H 0 ) = 0, then the Bayesian and the classicist will agree trivially, since Cr(H 0 ) = Cr E (H 0 ) for all E ∈ Σ for which Cr E is defined. They will also agree trivially when α = 0, since that means P (E|H 0 ) = 0 for any E ⊆ R. What we're interested is of course whether they can agree non-trivially. By Fact 3.1, it follows that non-trivial agreement is guaranteed in the situation depicted in Figure 5 , with rejection region R 2 for H 0 against H 1 . However, for any given α > 0, there are situations where the Bayesian and the classicist cannot agree non-trivially.
Here's such an example: Thus, using a test of size 0.05, the event E should lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis. However, since P (E|H 1 ) < P (E|H 0 ), it follows by Fact 3.1 that non-trivial agreement is impossible. Whatever his prior credences are (assuming that 0 < Cr(H 0 ) < 1), the Bayesian will deem the null hypothesis more likely after observing E than before.
Clearly, for any α > 0, a similar situation may arise if we make the sample size n a large enough sample size n for which an event E exists whose p-value is below α, although the event in question will prompt the Bayesian to increase his credence in H 0 . This is essentially just a version of Lindley's paradox (Lindley, 1957) . In the original paradox, however, a null hypothesis H 0 is tested against a set of alternatives {H µ : µ > 0} (or, as statisticians like to put it, a precise null hypothesis is tested against an imprecise or composite alternative). In order to generate the original paradox (i.e. in order to derive the conclusion that the Bayesian will increase his credence in the rejected null hypothesis), one has to assume that the Bayesian assigns a non-zero prior credence to it. But since the set of hypotheses is uncountable, this assumption is not very plausible, and it's possible to obtain agreement by simply denying it. In that case, the result is perhaps less problematic for the classicist. According to Spanos (2013) , it merely reveals that powerful tests are more sensitive, which is why we can use them to detect small changes in a population. Moreover, as argued by Sprenger (2013) , the original paradox may also be a problem for the Bayesian. But in the example at hand, where a precise null hypothesis is tested against an equally precise alternative, the result is more clearly problematic only for the classicist. Intuitively, there's no sense in which the observation of 23 F :s favors the alternative H 1 over H 0 .
The example indicates that, from a classical point of view, it may be unwise to settle for any particular test size in advance (e.g. α = 0.05), regardless of how small it is.
Indeed, for any particular sample size n, there is a most powerful test of some size (e.g. α = 0.02 when n = 50) for H 0 against H 1 with respect to which Bayesians and classicists can and, in fact, must agree. Such a situation is depicted in Figure 8 . According to Mayo and Spanos (2006, p. 345 general solution, however, that suggestion is problematic. As witnessed by the following example, it's possible to construct a situation where there's no α > 0 with respect to which Bayesians and classicists can agree:
Example 4.2. Let the null hypothesis H 0 be that the length of individuals in a certain population ranges between 0 and 10, and that it's (approximately) normally distributed with mean 5 and some variance v. Let the alternative hypothesis H 1 be that it ranges between 0 and 40, and that it's (approximately) normally distributed with mean 20 and the same variance v. the situation is depicted in Figure 9 . According to the null hypothesis, the average length of a random sample will range between 0 and 10 and be (approximately) normally distributed with mean 5 and some variance v ≤ v. According to the alternative, it will range between 0 and 40 and be (approximately) normally distributed with mean 20 and the same variance v . The situation is depicted in Figure   10 . Clearly, for any α > 0, a most powerful test of size α of the null hypothesis against Pericchi (2014). Conditionalizing on E will increase one's credence in the null hypothesis given any non-trivial assignment of prior credences to the null hypothesis and its alternative.
The upshot is that, if we assume that a classical statistician isn't allowed to increase his credence in the null hypothesis after he has rejected it, he either has to have trivial or incoherent credences to begin with, or fail to update his credences by conditionalization. the evidential value of a piece of information E ⊆ Ω to the evidential value of E ∪ R, or (in the case of Fisher) equates it to the evidential value of E or something more extreme.
Their evidential values are equated in the sense that they license exactly the same classical statistical inferences, respectively: E is sufficient for rejecting the null hypothesis just in case E ∪ R is, and the p-value of E is the same as the p-value of E or something more extreme. But E is generally not the same information as E ∪ R or E or something more extreme. For the Bayesian, they generally don't have the same evidential value. The point is a familiar one. Jeffreys (1980) put it this way: 5 I have always considered the arguments for the use of [p-values] absurd. They amount to saying that a hypothesis that may or may not be true is rejected because a greater departure from the trial value was improbable [under that hypothesis]; that is, that it has not predicted something that has not 4 Cf. Spanos (2006, 2011) . 5 I'm grateful to Uwe Saint-Mont for pointing this out to me.
happened.
Indeed, as the examples show, the null hypothesis may assign an arbitrarily low probability to E or something more extreme, and yet assign a higher probability to E than any alternative hypothesis. By Fact 3.1, the Bayesian will then increase his credence in the null hypothesis (given any non-trivial prior credences) although it's been rejected by the classicist.
Conclusion
Suppose that a classical statistician isn't allowed to have a higher degree of belief (credence) in a null hypothesis after he has rejected it than before. We have shown that, in certain situations, either he has to have trivial or incoherent credences to begin with, or fail to update his credences by conditionalization. Remember that, in the trivial case, he is either absolutely certain that the null hypothesis is true, or absolutely certain that it's false. For obvious reasons, that case is irrelevant in this context. In the non-trivial case, there are plenty of good arguments to the effect that the classical statistician is irrational. I'm thinking primarily of synchronic and diachronic Dutch book arguments, which I shall not rehearse here. At any rate, there's a conflict between classical statistics and the Bayesian theory of rational degrees of belief.
